“Behind the Scenes: America’s Race to Match China’s Naval Power”

The Rise of Jeongjo the Great

Escalating geopolitical tensions are observed for the Asia-Pacific region, and always at the forefront of these high-stakes power plays is the question of who will control the sea. The American navy declines at a time when the actual shipbuilding capabilities of the United States are really in question. The parallel that one must draw is with a rising Chinese navy, which is increasingly present and active in the seas that the American navy has long claimed for its own, in the service of an open international order that has, in my lifetime, prevented great power rivalry from spilling over into direct conflict.

In this article, we will argue that the U.S. Navy’s shrinking shipbuilding capacity, made worse by federal laws that restrict competition and a lack of sufficient shipyard capacity, poses a real threat to American sea power. We will explore the implications of this situation, especially concerning the ambitious Chinese challenge to U.S. maritime superiority, and consider ways in which the threat might be mitigated.

Challenges in U.S. Naval Shipbuilding

The influence of America’s shrinking navy goes far beyond military strategy. The Congressional Research Service has estimated that by 2030, the Chinese will have built and will be operating a fleet of 435 vessels—compared to our 325 and falling. Our fleet continues to shrink while theirs keeps growing, and they are expanding in areas of concern to almost all of us. They are particularly focused on the Pacific and the Arctic, which complicates our situation. Additionally, the Indian Ocean and the entire maritime situation there should be concerning to us. As we analyze this through a maritime strategy lens, it becomes clear that America risks losing a significant part of its global influence.

Since the 1970s, the U.S. shipbuilding industry has seen a sharp downward trend. Thirteen public shipyards once operated in this country, accounting for 5 percent of global ship tonnage. Now, there are only four. A 1965 federal law amendment that prohibited the Navy from buying ships made overseas has been like a hand grenade thrown into U.S. maritime strategy, allowing China to dominate global ship production. Our bets in this country have largely been on a recent South Korean production phenomenon, represented by the building of the Jeongjo the Great, a state-of-the-art naval vessel that somehow didn’t cost the South Korean shipbuilders what it would have cost to build in a U.S. shipyard.

South Korea’s Shipbuilding Advantage

Due to a lack of competition and a diminished industrial base, the U.S. shipbuilding industry has become prohibitively expensive. A destroyer built in South Korea takes 18 months and costs about $600 million, while a similar ship built in the U.S. takes 28 months and costs almost $1.5 billion. This inefficiency makes it hard for the Navy to maintain its position as number one. The decline in shipbuilding capacity directly affects America’s strategic posture in the Asia-Pacific region, as rising tensions over Taiwan make naval power projection more important than ever. The fleet’s size must at least equal that of its adversaries to uphold the Navy’s technological edge. The advantage of geography is a huge factor in this calculation, making China close to any potential conflict zone that directly affects U.S. interests and allies.

These problems have led the U.S. to look toward the South Korean shipbuilding industry. South Korea builds ships better and faster than the U.S. does. The recent deal under which the U.S. Navy can have its ships repaired in South Korea is a good first step. Now the challenge for the U.S. will be to repair its own shipbuilding infrastructure. The plan currently calls for sending U.S. naval engineers to South Korea to train in the superior techniques used by the South Korean shipbuilders. This will help the U.S. Navy hone its own shipbuilding skills and improve the efficiency of American shipyards. Still, even with the transfer of knowledge, the U.S. faces a tough row to hoe in even attempting to replicate the output of the South Korean shipyards.

Urgency Amid Rising Tensions

Some might argue that the U.S. Navy’s fleet size does not matter so much because technological advancements can compensate for it. They might contend that the Navy’s cutting-edge technology gives it an almost insurmountable advantage and that we shouldn’t worry so much about the number of ships in the fleet. To this line of thinking, we might imagine a sailor on a Navy destroyer going into battle with a piece of “Star Wars” technology, such as a laser, and how a high-tech weapon probably gives a sailor much more confidence and an edge compared to going into battle with a regular old cannon.

To most Americans, a dimming naval presence may appear to be of no direct concern, but it is tied to much larger issues that involve the average citizen. These issues revolve around national security and the overall stability of the world. A reduced force allows our adversaries to explore opportunities for mischief, pushing the limits of their own security operations; these are normally the operations that the U.S. Navy and its allies carry out across the globe. At a minimum, a weakening naval presence sends the wrong signal to nations that are not friendly to us, and it could easily happen that these places start trying to flex their military muscles.

In summary, the crisis in shipbuilding at the U.S. Navy is not only a problem from the standpoint of logistics but also a national security issue that needs to be addressed in short order. American shipbuilding is in serious decline, threatening the Navy’s capacity to build the ships it needs to maintain its edge. Yet world events dictate not only a presence for the Navy everywhere in the world but also a force that can handle whatever happens—countering piracy off the coast of Somalia, for instance, or maintaining freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.

With time running out, one stubborn question remains: Will the United States truly step up to this challenge and regain its position as number one on the world’s oceans, or is this the moment in history that future generations will look back on and say, “This was when American naval dominance began to decline”? The answer carries significant weight and will influence not just the future of the U.S. Navy but also the Navy’s geopolitical partnerships and the established order on the world’s oceans for many decades to come.

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